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Michael Otsuka 
 
Below is a slightly revised version of remarks I presented in April at a Political 
Studies Association Roundtable in Manchester, England, on G. A. Cohen’s book If 
You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2000). The roundtable discussants focussed exclusively 
on the last three chapters of the book. The general theme of the book is the relation 
between political ideologies and the choices that shape a person’s life.  The earlier 
chapters contain Cohen’s personal and philosophical reflections on the influence of 
his Communist upbringing and essays on Hegel and Marx. The first two of the last 
three chapters offer a critique from the left of John Rawls’s justification of income-
maximizing behaviour on the part of the talented that gives rise to inequalities that 
are to the benefit of the least well off. There Cohen argues that ‘egalitarian justice is 
not only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a matter of rules that define the structure 
of society, but also a matter of personal attitude and choice’. The last chapter 
contains a response to the arguments of philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and 
Ronald Dworkin that wealthy egalitarians do not have extensive obligations to bring 
about a more egalitarian society through acts of private charity. 
 
G. A. Cohen argues that it is unjust for talented, well paid individuals 
to engage in certain forms of income-maximizing market behaviour. 
This behaviour is unjust even though it would also be unjust to 
criminalize, fine, or otherwise officially penalise people for engaging 
in it. Moreover, a society in which such income-maximizing 
behaviour is common among the talented is ceteris paribus less just 
than a society in which such behaviour is rare. It follows that a 
society might be less than fully just even if everyone fully conforms 
to all of the legally enforceable requirements that are mandated by 
justice. 
For purposes of illustration, let me offer an extreme example of 
such behaviour. Not so long ago, the jumbo jet pilots of an American 
airline went on strike for higher wages even though their average 
salary was already comfortably in excess of $100,000 and the most 
senior pilots were earning close to $200,000. They went on strike 
even though they knew that this would inflict hardship on the much 
less well paid flight attendants and baggage handlers who would be 
forced by the airline to go on leave without pay for the duration of 
the strike. These pilots expressed no solidarity with their much less 
well paid fellow employees by demanding any rise in their wages in 
addition to their own salaries. They also showed no solidarity with 
commuter pilots working for the same employer but at a much lower 
average salary of around $30,000. These pilots could afford to amass 
an enormous hardship fund out of their high earnings in order to 
ensure that they could survive a long strike. But they didn’t share the 
proceeds of this fund with the flight attendants and baggage handlers 
who were obviously without such resources to weather a long strike 
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and would soon need to look for temporary work elsewhere in order 
to pay the rent.1 
The actions of these pilots would, I think, qualify as a particularly 
ruthless and extreme example of the income-maximizing market 
behaviour of the talented that Cohen would condemn as unjust. Note 
however that their strike was perfectly legal and probably ought to 
have been legal. It ought to have been legal for both a principled and 
a pragmatic reason. The principled reason has to do with the fact that 
the right to strike arguably follows from the right to withhold one’s 
labour -- i.e., the right not to be forced to work. This is a fundamental 
liberty which any just society should in principle be loath to deny.2 
Perhaps it is justifiable to force people to work when their going on 
strike would cause irreparable and serious harm. (Think of laws 
against strikes by ambulance workers.) But the case of the airline 
pilots was not one such case. Second, there is a pragmatic reason to 
advocate as liberal a policy as possible regarding the right to strike, 
given the interests of those other workers who genuinely need the 
power of the strike in order to secure just terms and conditions of 
employment. The thought is that any erosion of the right to strike is 
bound to harm those who have just cause to strike. 
I am at one with Cohen on the following two points: (1) the 
behaviour of such pilots is unjust even if justifiably legal, and (2) a 
society in which many among the well off engage in this and other 
forms of income-maximizing market behaviour is for that reason a 
less just society than one in which fewer do. 
Some, however, who affirm a Rawlsian approach to justice would 
deny the second of these claims. Consider the following Rawlsian (or 
at least Rawls-inspired) denial of (2). According to this denial, a 
Rawlsian about justice ought readily to concede that the behaviour of 
these pilots is unjust. But it does not follow that a society is less just 
in which more rather than fewer engage in such behaviour. The 
reason it does not follow is that, on a Rawlsian approach, a 
distinction is drawn between social and other forms of justice. Rawls 
himself draws the distinction as follows: 
 
Many different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust: not only 
laws, institutions, and social systems, but also particular actions of many 
kinds, including decisions, judgments, and imputations. We also call the 
attitudes and dispositions of persons, and persons themselves, just and 
unjust. Our topic, however, is that of social justice. For us the primary 
subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the 
 
1 These are, at least, the facts as I recall them. This should be treated as a realistic 
hypothetical case insofar as it departs from the actual facts. 
2 John Rawls writes that ‘The priority of liberty means that we cannot be forced to engage 
in work that is highly productive in terms of material goods. What kind of work people 
do, and how hard they do it, is up to them to decide in light of the various incentives 
society offers’ (Justice as Fairness: A Restatement [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2001], p. 64). (But see also ibid. p. 67, fn. 35, where Rawls’s 
condemnation of collusion might be read to condemn the actions of these airline pilots.) 
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way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.3 
 
In Chapter 9 of his book, Cohen argues that there is no plausible 
drawing of the boundaries of the basic structure of society according 
to which the income-maximizing but justifiably legal behaviour of 
people such as these airline pilots (and many less ruthlessly self-
seeking individuals) turns out to fall outside of the basic structure and 
hence beyond the bounds of social justice. 
The Rawlsian response that I am now considering contends that 
Cohen’s labours are much ado about nothing, at least when trained 
against those Rawlsians who are happy to acknowledge that the 
behaviour of these pilots is unjust. They are much ado about nothing 
because the dispute amounts to nothing more than a relatively 
insubstantial squabble about words. The dispute isn’t one about the 
boundaries of justice and what lies beyond justice. Rather, it’s one 
about a supposed boundary internal to justice -- namely, the 
boundary, if any, which separates social justice from the justice of 
‘the attitudes and dispositions of persons, and persons themselves’. 
I would resist such an attempt to minimize the significance of the 
debate, since I think there is something substantial at issue. What is 
at issue is whether the injustices of the aforementioned pilots and 
others are of a piece with other sorts of social injustice that are 
without any question the subject of political philosophy. Or, 
alternatively, whether they are only of a piece with the sorts of 
injustice which, though very real and significant, are rightfully 
regarded as irrelevant, or only indirectly relevant, to political 
philosophy. To offer some examples of the latter: Someone who is 
quick to accuse a lover of infidelity, or a friend of betrayal, on the 
basis of insufficient evidence, or who holds friends to standards of 
conduct which he does not reciprocate, or who inspires jealousy by 
lavishing more affection on one of two children, is appropriately 
described as an unjust person. But these injustices have little or 
nothing to do with the topic of justice which is the subject of political 
philosophy. The injustice of income-maximizing market behaviour 
among the talented does, by contrast, seem to be a piece with other 
sorts of injustice that are uncontroversially the subject of political 
philosophy. Hence it would be a distortion to detach these injustices 
from the topic of social justice. 
Cohen would offer the following explanation of why a society 
replete with income-maximizing high flyers is less just than one in 
which most are moved by an egalitarian ethos. He would say that the 
former society is less just because many more citizens in this society 
fail to ‘affirm and act upon the correct principles of [distributive] 
justice…’ (p. 131) The correct principles of distributive justice state 
 
3 A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 7. 
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(or imply) that ‘there is injustice in distribution when inequality of 
goods reflect not such things as differences in the arduousness of 
different people’s labors, or people’s different preferences and 
choices with respect to income and leisure, but myriad forms of 
lucky and unlucky circumstance’ (p. 130). Those individuals who 
engage in self-seeking maximizing behaviour can see that their 
behaviour collectively gives rise to substantial inequality. Hence they 
fail to ‘affirm and act upon the correct principles of [distributive] 
justice’. 
I would like to explore the following difficulty for Cohen which 
arises from his account of the just society and his account of 
distributive justice. 
Cohen must maintain either that a society is rendered less just by 
the forms of highly personal unjust behaviour mentioned above (i.e., 
the accusing of lovers or friends of infidelity on the basis of 
insufficient evidence, etc.), or that it is not. 
If he maintains that it is rendered less just, then Cohen has taken 
the slogan that ‘the personal is political’ too far. Surely not 
everything having to do with our personal relations is political -- not 
even everything which makes these relations unjust. The highly 
personal forms of unjust behaviour to which I just alluded seem 
clearly to fall outside of the boundaries of social justice. 
If, however, he maintains that a society is not rendered less just by 
these forms of highly personal behaviour, then Cohen must provide a 
principled basis for explaining why the political extends part, but not 
all, of the way into the personal realm. He must explain why the 
political encompasses both the income-maximizing market behaviour 
of the talented and the sexist division of domestic labour in the 
household (which also makes a society less just, by his lights), but 
does not also encompass the forms of highly personal unjust 
behaviour mentioned earlier. But, as I shall show, he has not yet 
provided such a basis. 
Cohen demonstrates that the grounds to which Rawls appeals to 
justify the thesis that the basic structure is the subject of social justice 
actually undermine the claim that the justifiably legal but 
inegalitarian behaviour of talented income-maximizers and 
domestically sexist husbands fall outside of the boundaries of social 
justice. These grounds are, most crucially, that ‘the basic structure is 
the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound.…’4 
Cohen notes, however, that the effects of the behaviour of income-
maximizers and domestic-labour shirkers can be profound. 
But many forms of highly personal behaviour which seem quite 
clearly to fall outside of the boundaries of social justice can also have 
a profound effect on the lives of individuals. The forms of highly 
personal injustice described earlier can have an extremely destructive 
 
4 Cohen, p. 138 (quoting Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7). 
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effect on the harmony and stability of marital and other familial 
relationships. It is a truism that marital discord, separation, and 
divorce, among other things, can have a profound effect on the lives 
of both the married partners and their children. They can have such 
an effect even when the roots of this disharmony and instability 
cannot be traced to such politically or socially unjust factors as 
sexism. These effects have an unequal impact on the lives of 
individuals and cannot always or often have been said to have been 
deserved by the victims because brought upon themselves. 
The highly personal but non-unjust choices of individuals can also 
have a profound and unequal impact on the lives of individuals. We 
need only think of Robert Nozick’s unlucky suitor who, despite his 
best efforts and through no fault of his, is lonely and unhappy 
because of the non-unjust choices of others.5 Or of Nozick’s case of 
universally unappealing Z who, as the result of the choices of A 
through Y and A’ through Y’, is stuck with nobody else to marry but 
universally unappealing Z’.6 People obviously do not have equality 
of opportunity for welfare when it comes to marriage, friendship, and 
family ties. The effects of these inequalities can have a profound 
effect on one’s well being. Yet we do not regard a society less just on 
account of the fact that the choices of people regarding friends and 
partners are not guided or even constrained by a principle of 
equalising opportunity for welfare. 
Cohen does not himself explicitly endorse the Rawlsian claim that 
profundity of effect brings something within the ambit of social 
justice. His turning of that Rawlsian claim against Rawls might be 
read as nothing more than an internal critique. But even if it is no 
more than that, Cohen’s own theory of distributive justice lands him 
in the same difficulty since it also makes the political too personal. 
This difficulty arises for Cohen from the fact that his theory of 
distributive justice offers an expansive and unqualified account of the 
sorts of goods which should be equalised. These goods include 
access to the following three types of ‘advantage’: worldly goods, 
physical and mental capacities, and welfare.7 It follows from this 
theory that differences in welfare which result from circumstances 
beyond an individual’s control disrupt distributive justice even if 
these differences are solely the result of the behaviour of other 
individuals concerning their close personal relationships. It also 
follows that a society is rendered less just insofar as individuals fail 
to affirm and act on a principle of distributive justice according to 
which inequalities which arise even from these highly personal 
sources should be counteracted. 
How might we try to draw the boundary that separates these forms 
of conduct which justifiably lie outside of the coercive legal 
 
5 Robert Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 237. 
6 Ibid., p. 263. 
7 See Cohen’s ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics 99 (1989): 906-944. 
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structure, disrupt equality of opportunity for welfare, but do not 
thereby render society less just, and other forms of conduct, such as 
those of the airline pilots or the sexist shirkers of domestic labour, 
which also justifiably lie outside of the coercive legal structure, 
disrupt equality of opportunity for welfare, but do thereby render 
society less just? 
One difference between income-maximizing and these highly 
personal activities that seem to lie beyond social justice is that the 
former involves a complaint about inequality in the distribution of 
worldly resources, whereas the latter do not. But this fact is not 
enough to place these latter cases beyond social justice, since Cohen 
would say that the correct principles of distributive justice give rise 
to claims for compensation for deficiencies in mental and physical 
capacities and in welfare among those with equal worldly resources. 
Consider the following four cases, in each of which inequality in 
welfare arises solely through the choices of individuals regarding 
association and not through any inequality in the distribution of 
worldly resources. These examples presuppose the following 
background of a three-person island society. Each person owns one 
third of the island. In the absence of any association with one 
another, the three inhabitants, Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, are equally 
well off in welfare terms. 
 
Case 1: Beta and Gamma form a two-person mutual protective 
association from which they exclude Alpha simply because they 
do not prefer his company. This mutual protective association 
governs a territory which consists of the combination of their two 
plots of land. They are thereby able more effectively to protect one 
another (but not their property) against injury from outside 
invaders or natural disaster. 
 
Case 2: Beta and Gamma form a business partnership from which 
they exclude Alpha simply because they do not prefer his 
company. The business itself and the rewards which they receive 
do not involve worldly resources, since the business consists of 
nothing more than the trading of services. Beta and Gamma as a 
partnership are much more successful per capita than any of the 
three could be on his own. 
 
Case 3: Beta and Gamma form a friendship, but they do not 
befriend Alpha. Indeed they hurtfully ignore and shun Alpha 
simply because they find him a bit dull and not attuned to their 
catty sense of humour, their sadistic put downs, and their love of 
malicious gossip. 
 
Case 4: Beta and Gamma fall blissfully in love with one another, 
and neither falls in love with Alpha, though Alpha is besotted with 
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each of them. Beta and Gamma behave admirably towards Alpha, 
befriending and looking after him. Nevertheless, Alpha ends up 
much less happy than they. 
 
In each of the four examples, Alpha is, through no fault of his, less 
well off than Beta and Gamma. Let us assume that the gap that arises 
between the welfare of Alpha on the one hand and of Beta and 
Gamma on the other hand is, in each case, just as great. Let us also 
assume that it would be possible, through a redistribution of worldly 
resources, to eliminate this gap.  
It follows from Cohen’s theory of distributive justice that each of 
the above associations gives rise to a distributive injustice, that the 
distributive injustice is equally great in each of the four cases, and 
that justice requires either a dissolution of the association or a 
redistribution of resources in order fully to compensate Alpha. 
Moreover, Alpha and Beta render the society in which they live 
unjust if they neither redistribute nor dissolve their association. 
My own take on these four cases, by contrast, is as follows: Cases 
(1) and (2), but not (3) and (4), involve social injustice (or three-
person analogues of social injustice if three is not enough to make a 
society). Cases (1) through (3), but not (4), involve injustice in the 
behaviour of individuals. Case (4) involves no injustice whatsoever. 
Those who lose out in cases such as (4) might be entitled to treatment 
or other forms of compensation for mental or physical illnesses such 
as depression or hypertension which arise from such loneliness. But 
they are not entitled to compensation simply to eliminate inequalities 
in welfare that arise from others’ choices of friends or lovers. 
In conclusion, even if Cohen has shown that Rawls has erred in the 
direction of failing to recognize forms of personal behaviour which 
render society less just, I hope to have shown that his own 
contrasting approach to distributive justice errs in the opposite 
direction of falsely condemning too much personal behaviour as 
rendering society less just. 
